The paper explores the domestic and international context of Hungary's emerging international development policy. Specifically, it looks at three factors that may influence how this policy operates: membership in the European Union and potential 'Europeanization', Hungary's wider foreign policy strategy, and the influence of domestic stakeholders. In order to uncover how these factors affect the country's international development policy, semi structured interviews were carried out with the main stakeholders. The main conclusions are: (1) While accession to the EU did play a crucial role in re-starting Hungary's international development policy, membership in the integration has had little effect since then. (2) International development policy seems to mainly serve Hungary's regional strategic foreign policy and economic interests, and not global development goals. (3) Although all domestic development stakeholders are rather weak, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs still seems to play a dominating role. Convergence to European requirements and best practices is therefore clearly hindered by foreign policy interests and also by the weakness of nongovernmental stakeholders.
Hungarian international development co-operation: context, stakeholders and performance
Introduction
The Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, namely the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, the three Baltic countries, and later Romania and Bulgaria all became members of the international aid donor community in the past decade. In fact, in 2011 we could celebrate the tenth anniversary of the re-emergence of these policies in CEE, as in 2001 some of the countries above accepted their first official documents relating to international development. Therefore, it is increasingly inappropriate to call these countries 'new' donors, although their development policies are still very different than those of the older, more established Western donors, or internationally agreed 'best practices'. This paper takes a closer look at one of these emerging donors, Hungary. Hungary was one of the first CEE countries to re-create its international development policy between 2001 and 2003, but in the past years activity in this field seems to have stagnated. There seems to be no clear strategy or direction for the future and no discussion on how and why Hungary should aid poorer countries. Resources spent on development cooperation are low and stagnating, public attention on the topic is negligible and there is no political discourse. This current state of affairs can only partly be explained by the weak economic performance of Hungary and government austerity measures. The paper argues that in order to gain a better understanding of Hungary's international development policy, one must look at other factors. The main goal of the paper therefore is to explore the context of Hungarian international development cooperation and its implications on the practice and performance of the country's international development policy. I discuss three contextual sources of influence on Hungary's external assistance policy: membership in the EU, wider foreign policy strategy and the influence of domestic stakeholders. Specifically, I formulate the following three research questions: (1) Has membership in the European Union had any effect on the policy area? (2) Is the country's international development policy affected by wider strategic foreign policy goals? (3) How do the interests and power-relations of domestic development stakeholders affect Hungary's international development policy?
The main conclusions of the paper are that membership in the EU has had little noticeable effect in shaping Hungary's development policy since 2004; international development policy seems to serve Hungarian external political and economic interests;
and that although all stakeholders are rather weak, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs still seems to play a dominating role. Convergence to European requirements and best practices is clearly hindered by foreign policy interests and also by the weakness of nongovernmental stakeholders. These issues make the creation of a unified vision on why and how Hungary should provide aid to less fortunate countries difficult.
All three of the contextual sources of influence could constitute separate research agendas. Therefore, this paper should be seen rather as an exploratory research, setting the agenda for future, more detailed inquires into the topic. Also, the paper does not attempt to describe Hungarian international policy in detail; rather it wishes to shed light on the dynamics behind the current state of affairs. Written material and data on Hungary's international development policy is limited, and there has not been much scholarly work on the topic either. In order to overcome this problem, I carried out seven semi-structured qualitative interviews with representatives of the various stakeholders. My interviewees included a senior policy official and a desk officer, as well as a former mid-level director, all from the Directorate of International Development at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I also interviewed a senior desk officer, working on issues related to tied aid credits from the Ministry of National Economy.
My last three respondents are three experts working at various Hungarian development NGO's, both in policy and 'on the field.' For reasons of confidentiality, their identities are not revealed.
The contribution of the paper to the literature is that it expands the rather scarce academic literature on development policies in the CEE countries, and provides an approach for understanding the evolution of the policy area in the case of Hungary. This sets the agenda for future, more detailed research, and can be applied to other CEE countries as well. The paper is structured around the three topics introduced above.
Section 2 briefly reviews the history of Hungary's international development policy and the present challenges it faces. Section 3 analyzes the effects EU membership has had (or has failed to have) on Hungary's international development policy. Section 4 discusses the domestic policy context, and section 5 looks at the interests and relative power and influence of the development stakeholders. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Hungary's international development policy: history and present challenges
The history of development policies in the CEE countries and the current challenges they face is rather well documented. Most studies focus on the early beginnings (Dauderstädt, ed. 2002) , the difficulties and deficiencies faced by the CEE donors (Bucar and Mrak, 2007) and more recently the interactions between these new donors and the European Union (Carbone, 2004; Lightfoot, 2008; Horky, 2010) . In case of Hungary, the works of Kiss (2002; and Paragi (2010) are the most important sources, as well as the review by HUN-IDA (2004) . In this section I do not wish to repeat the findings of this literature, rather just give a brief overview of how development policy emerged in Hungary and what difficulties the country faces today.
All CEE countries, including Hungary, had international development policies during Communism. While there has hardly been any detailed academic research on these pre-1989 development policies, the most important characteristic is easy to identify: heavy influence of the Soviet Union's geostrategic objectives. This included providing assistance mainly to Soviet allies or developing countries with heavily leftist governments; no clear distinction between military and development aid; a high reliance on technical assistance and tied aid; and the extensive usage of scholarships (for more details, see Kiss, 2002; HUN-IDA, 2004) . According to some estimates, the resources Hungary devoted to foreign assistance reached 0.7 percent of the country's national income in the late seventies, although this cannot be compared to aid expenditures today due to methodological differences. In most CEE donors, including Hungary, the impact of the Communist-era development policy can be identified to this date (Szent-Iványi Hungary's aid policy on the other hand is heavily donor driven and is characterized by low amounts spent on bilateral cooperation, a high share of tied aid, the proliferation of small projects, inefficient delivery structures and the almost total lack of evaluation (Paragi 2010) . Aid is given mostly to middle income neighboring countries, which implies that poverty reduction is not really a goal (Szent-Iványi 2010) . Table 1 The stagnation of the ODA/GNI level is a symptom of a more general lack of progress within Hungary's international development policy, which cannot be explained solely 
The effects of EU membership
'Europeanization' has become a very popular concept in the past decade for understanding changes and dynamics in various policy areas due to membership in the EU or the prospect of it. During the accession process of the CEE countries to the EU, requirements were voiced that these countries should contribute to international development efforts -thus, the EU was a crucial factor in the re-emergence of the development policies of the CEE countries, and this has made the concept of Europeanization an increasingly popular framework to study these new policies (Vittek and Lightfoot 2009; Lightfoot 2010; Horky 2010) . The concept can be useful for structuring the discussion on how EU membership has affected Hungarian development policy, so I introduce it briefly.
Europeanization is most generally understood as the process through which countries adopt formal and informal European rules and policies (Graziano and Vink 2007: 7; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 7) . The basic model on Europeanization, advocated by Risse, Cowles and Caporaso (2001: 6-12) states that laws (institutions, methods, processes, norms, behavioral rules etc.) originating from the EU level may be incongruous with relevant legislation of the nation states. Depending on how large this gap is, pressures arise for the nation state to adapt to the 'European way' of doing things. However, these pressures are mediated through domestic institutions, and a multitude of factors will influence whether and how the country actually changes its policies. In the end some national institutional and policy outcome will emerge, which may eliminate or reduce the original misfit, or even leave it unchanged. The pressures for change therefore may still remain, and the entire process starts again in a cyclical manner.
The two main channels for Europeanization to happen are through conditionality and socialization (Checkel 2001 , Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005 , Juncos 2010 ). In case of the former, member states are obliged to comply with any hard legislation accepted by the EU institutions. The EU can formulate explicit conditions towards accession countries as well, and often it can have an even larger leverage on these countries than it has on its own members (i.e. their accession process can be stalled if they do not comply). On the other hand, a more constructivist approach to Europeanization emphasizes the importance of longer term socialization and social learning. This involves the internalization of European values and formal rules, as well as the gradual development of the conviction that that is the only proper way to act.
While Europeanization through conditionality can be rather explicit and quick, social learning is a slow process and also much more difficult to identify in practice. The two approaches however, while relying on different theoretical backgrounds, are not mutually exclusive. In policy areas where conditionality and coercion are not possible, social learning can be the only channel for Europeanization to occur.
The question therefore is: is there evidence of Europeanization in Hungary's development policy? In the past two decades the EU has attempted to considerably increase its influence on bilateral member state development policies, but the EU also had a chance to prescribe explicit criteria during the accession negotiations that Hungarian development policy must meet.
The influence on member states comes from several sources. The Treaty of Maastricht introduced qualitative requirements for both EU-level and member state development policies with the concepts of complementarily, coherence and coordination (the so- Europeanization in the short term can be most effective through explicit conditionality.
However, almost all the requirements the EU voices towards member states in the field of international development fall into the category of soft law, i.e. they are mainly only recommendations. The EU could have formulated conditions during Hungary's accession negotiations, but it did not. It is well documented that international development (included in the negotiating chapter on trade) was neglected during the accession negotiations and no specific requirements were voiced, besides the fact that Hungary, as all other CEE countries, must create such a policy (Fodor 2003 believe that Hungarian development policy should not follow blindly the requirements of the EU, but should take Hungary's situation into account as well. For example, they maintain that Hungary should receive economic and political benefits from giving aid and thus tying aid to exports is justified. They do acknowledge that many issues that the EU raises, such as placing a greater emphasis on evaluation and feedback are generally important, but Hungary has other priorities, such as building a constituency for aid. As these issues are related to the other two sources of influence on Hungarian external development policy, they will be discussed in more detail below.
European values and norms on development are therefore far from being internalized by the Hungarian MFA officials. They have learned to "talk the talk", but my impression from the interviews was that they mostly see the various committee meetings as terrains for national interest implementation and not opportunities for themselves to learn and adapt.
In sum, the current practice of Hungarian development policy is rather far from the soft requirements of the European Union. Conditionality is only present on the technical level and has had no real effect on policies. There seems to be little evidence for social learning either, but this can be due to the fact that Hungary has not been a member of the EU long enough for the mechanics of social learning to kick in. I conclude that there is little evidence of Europeanization in Hungary's international development policy.
Foreign Policy Strategy and Development
I now turn to a second source of influence on Hungarian international development policy: the wider foreign policy context. It is widely agreed that international foreign aid is a tool of foreign policy, and can be used to serve specific foreign policy goals, such influencing other countries, building alliances, creating stability and increasing global security (Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2005) . In this section I briefly identify the main strategic goals of Hungary's foreign policy, and then look at how these relate to the current allocation of foreign aid. Table 2 shows a breakdown of these bilateral funds. Total bilateral 26 590 100
*: The budget spent by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not broken down in the report. Most of it was
probably allocated to Afghanistan, and it also includes the amounts spent on humanitarian aid.
Source: calculations of the author, based on Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011: 36-47) As can be seen from Table 2 , countries in the Balkans and in the former Soviet region receive the highest chunk of Hungary's bilateral aid. A significant portion (15%) of these resources is actually channeled to support ethic Hungarians in Serbia and the Ukraine. Only 3% of Hungary's bilateral aid is channeled to African countries, and even that is mainly in the form of scholarships to Hungary, so some may argue that it benefits Hungary even more in the form of brain drain than it does the African countries. The single largest receiving county is however Afghanistan, where Hungary, as a part of the NATO coalition is in charge of a provincial reconstruction team, and therefore has an international obligation to contribute to the development of the country. Looking at the allocation data, it is clear that it is more in-line with second pillar foreign policy objectives than it is with global poverty reduction. Developing countries (with the exception of Afghanistan), where poverty is a huge issue, democratic values and the respect for human rights have much to ask for and the quality of governance is low receive much lower amounts of aid than middle income neighboring countries.
My interviews basically reinforced this conclusion based on aid allocation data.
Respondents from the MFA mentioned that Hungary's main comparative advantages and foreign policy interests dictate giving aid to the neighboring countries, and to those countries which Hungarian actors "know well", the latter clearly implying countries with which Hungary has had more extensive development relations during Communism, such as Vietnam, the Palestinian Authority, or Yemen. Hungarian NGO's and private companies clearly have some advantages in the neighboring countries, but giving aid to such partners is also underpinned by foreign and security policy considerations, such as the need for regional stability. One respondent cited the case of the Kosovo war in 1999, which had an adverse affect on foreign investments to Hungary. The official I interviewed from the Ministry of National Economy mainly emphasized economic interests, saying that foreign aid should be used as a tool to pave the way for Hungarian exports and investments in the neighboring countries.
Hungary is not perceived to have any comparative advantage in giving aid to Africa. As mentioned by an MFA respondent, Africa is for "the big players". Building a presence in Africa in order to deliver efficient development aid has high fixed costs, which Hungary cannot afford. As Hungary currently only has two embassies in Sub-Saharan African countries (in South Africa and Kenya), one can hardly argue that the continent figures highly among foreign policy and international development considerations.
NGO respondents complained that poverty reduction is not a true goal of Hungary's international development policy, because if it were, Hungary would devote a larger attention to regions were the return on aid in terms of people lifted out of poverty would by higher. It was also mentioned that the lack of the MFA's attention towards Africa is highly frustrating and makes the work of NGO's dedicated towards the region highly difficult.
One may argue that the relatively large amounts spent in Afghanistan can be attributed to the third pillar of Hungary's foreign policy strategy, and so can multilateral aid (which makes up some 75% percent of Hungary's total ODA). However, the Hungarian mission in Afghanistan seems to be perceived as an international obligation, and much of Hungary's multilateral aid is based on compulsory membership fees, and so the country has little freedom in deciding how much it pays and how it is spent. References in the foreign policy strategy to global poverty, the MDG's, or the respect for human rights may thus be a further example of Hungarian politicians and officials having learned to 'talk the talk' of international development, but they are not supported strongly by aid allocation.
Summing up this section and answering the second research question, it is clear that Hungary's international development policy is affected by wider foreign policy, as foreign aid is used to a large extent to promote Hungarian political and economic interests in the region, such as maintaining stability, helping ethnic Hungarians and building economic opportunities for Hungarian companies. Aid is used to a much lesser extent in decreasing global poverty, promoting the respect for human rights, i.e. the goals elaborated in pillar three of the country's foreign policy strategy.
Development stakeholders
Finally I turn to a third potential source of influence on international development policy: the power relations between domestic stakeholders and their interests. The literature on how domestic dynamics affect international development policy in a country is still rather sparse, and these dynamics are not well understood. It is clear that political parties may have their own preferences, for example socialist parties may put a larger emphasis on solidarity (Hopkins 2000) . Governing parties also react to the wider public opinion, although international development -like foreign policy in general -is not highly sensitive to it (Otter 2003) .
Within the government, the bureaucracies that take part in the day-to-day practice of international development are also major stakeholders. In fact, ministry officials can often have an important role in shaping policy, if political attention on the topic is low, or other interest groups are divided. In many OECD DAC countries it was the officials of the foreign ministries that pushed for reforms (or in case of the EU's common development policy, the officials in the Commission played a leading role, see Carbone 2007). Staff working on international development issues may be more concerned about aid effectiveness, because their prestige and future budget depends on the impact of their work. Thus, such staff may push for aid policies that are likely to increase the impact of aid. As I show below, this is not the case in Hungary.
Other stakeholders would mainly include those who are profiting from the "development business", either financially or otherwise: private companies and development NGO's. It is clear that one cannot lump NGO's and private companies into a single group, as NGO's -while also making a living from international developmentdo not seek profit, but rather have ethical and moral motivations. While private companies would clearly prefer aid practices which provide them with clear benefits (such as tied aid), NGO's would advocate practices which are more beneficial for the partners, and so more in-line with international best practices.
In the remainder of this section, I will briefly analyze the interests and relative power of two major development stakeholders in Hungary: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and development NGO's. As mentioned earlier, international development issues are not part of the everyday political dialogue in Hungary, in fact they hardly ever are an issue.
Political parties rarely raise the topic, which clearly indicates that they do not figure high on the political agenda. Due to this, I will not discuss the interests of political actors. While private companies that benefit from the aid business do exist in Hungary, their numbers are definitely low and they are difficult to identify, therefore I discuss their role only marginally.
Due to the lack of political attention, the bureaucracy of the MFA may have larger possibilities to define how international development policy is shaped. The institutional set-up for international development in Hungary is highly fragmented: there is no single budget-line for foreign aid, almost all line-ministries are involved to some degree. The MFA has a central, coordinating role, and is also in charge of policy formulation. This Turning to development NGO's, their weakness stemming in part from the Communist era and Hungary's relatively lower incomes, is still a problem they must overcome.
Financing their activities can often seem daunting: raising resources from donations has proven difficult, so they must rely on grants from the state or international Therefore, it is clear that despite their lack of resources, NGO's do try to shape Hungary's international development policy, using both formal institutions and other means. They are committed to increasing the effectiveness of aid, focusing it more on global poverty reduction, and also on increasing the transparency of the MFA and other ministries.
Respondents from NGO's however complained that the MFA does not treat them as partners. The flow of information from the ministry is slow at best and the opinions of NGO's are rarely asked for. Their requests for information often take a long time to be processed, and grant applications often include unfavorable conditions for them, although in the past years due to austerity measures, the MFA's budget for such grants has greatly decreased. The formal meetings seem to the NGO's as little more than talk shops, as the problems raised are rarely followed up or acted upon. In fact, one respondent mentioned that the MFA seems to treat them with outright hostility, which seems to be in stark contrast with what ministry officials have said about the need to strengthen domestic NGO's. This contradiction may be difficult to explain. While it may point to differences in perceptions, it may also hint towards the possibility that helping domestic actors is just rhetoric on the side of the MFA. Or -as one NGO respondent put it -the MFA simply does not like being told what to do.
All these issues may imply that NGO's may not be able to exert substantial influence on Hungary's international development policy. Still, most NGO's do agree that they did have an important impact in the past years in making the MFA more transparent and forcing it to disclose more information publicly on its activities. Summing up this section, both the MFA and development NGO's have weaknesses, but it seems that the former is more powerful and thus able to have a larger influence on international development. However, the MFA seems to favor a policy which is aligned with Hungarian political and economic interests and not so much with global poverty reduction. The reasons for the MFA's motivations are unclear. Higher level political interest in the issue and clear political guidance are greatly needed.
Conclusions
In the paper I have discussed three potential sources of influence which may have had a role in shaping Hungary's emerging international development policy in the past decade: membership in the EU, Hungarian foreign policy priorities, and relationships and relative power of domestic stakeholders. These three factors are of course heavily interrelated and all three must be taken into consideration when explaining the evolution of Hungary's international development policy.
The main conclusion that emerges is that in the past decade Hungary's international development policy seems to have been guided mainly by Hungary's political and economic interests, as the close links between the country's foreign policy strategy and aid allocation demonstrate. Foreign aid is used to a much lesser extent to promote global development and poverty reduction. The requirements of the EU (which are mainly in the domain of soft law) in this policy area, which mandate the increase of aid effectiveness in decreasing global poverty have had little impact on Hungary's practice.
One potential reason for this can be found in the dynamics between the domestic stakeholders: development staff at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs seems to support the current approach, and therefore the MFA has failed to act as a catalyst in orienting development policy towards a more global, poverty-focused approach. Higher level political guidance is lacking and development NGO's are too weak to achieve any substantial influence.
These dynamics may allow one to draw conclusions on the potential future evolution of Hungarian development cooperation. Most importantly, convergence to EU practices will likely be slow, and it will only take place as incomes and development experience in Hungary increase, allowing the country to play more of a global role, and also strengthening development actors. International pressures which try to push for a quick adaptation of Hungary's international development policy to European or other standards are likely to be unsuccessful.
As emphasized in the introduction, this research should be seen as exploratory, and all three sources of influence need further investigation, especially concerning the casual mechanics. Future research may also attempt to uncover similar dynamics in other CEE countries and thus provide a possibility for comparison.
